The Citizen Participation Act of 2009: Federal Legislation as Effective Defense Against SLAPPs by O\u27Neill, Jesse J
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 2 Learning From Disaster: Lessons for the Future
From the Gulf of Mexico
Article 12
5-1-2011
The Citizen Participation Act of 2009: Federal
Legislation as Effective Defense Against SLAPPs
Jesse J. O'Neill
jesse.oneill.2@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jesse J. O'Neill, The Citizen Participation Act of 2009: Federal Legislation as Effective Defense Against
SLAPPs, 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 477 (2011), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol38/iss2/
12
THE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ACT OF 2009: 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION AS AN EFFECTIVE 
DEFENSE AGAINST SLAPPS 
Jesse J. O’Neill* 
Abstract: The First Amendment to the United States Constitution ex-
pressly guarantees the right of citizens to petition the government. Citi-
zen efforts have been particularly crucial to the process of creating, shap-
ing, and enforcing environmental laws. Nevertheless, citizen participants 
in government can often find themselves facing retaliation in the form of 
a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). SLAPPs are law-
suits brought to interfere with a party's exercise of its right to petition the 
government, typically by draining the party's time and resources. Al-
though many states have adopted anti-SLAPP protections, similar protec-
tions are lacking at the federal level. Because so many federal environ-
mental statutes rely on citizen participation, the threat of a SLAPP is 
especially high. This Note argues that current federal anti-SLAPP protec-
tions are inadequate, and that legislation proposed in 2009 would better 
protect the right of citizens to petition the government. 
Introduction 
 “The problem of freedom in America is that of maintaining a 
competition of ideas, and you do not achieve that by silencing one 
brand of idea.”1 In recent years, citizen and non-governmental organi-
zation (NGO) environmental watchdogs have experienced the silenc-
ing of their brand of idea at the hands of a legal construct known as a 
SLAPP.2 A SLAPP is a “strategic lawsuit against public participation.”3 
Although only a subject of study over approximately the last twenty 
years, SLAPPs have existed in the American judicial system almost since 
its beginning.4 SLAPPs are used to prevent or punish others for exercis-
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2010–11. 
1 Max Lerner, The Muzzling of the Movies, in Actions and Passions: Notes on the 
Multiple Revolution of Our Time 75, 77 (Kennikat Press 1969) (1949). 
2 See George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking 
Out 84 (1996). 
3 Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 
Soc. Probs. 506, 506 (1988). 
4 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at x, 17. 
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ing their right to petition, a right protected by the First Amendment’s 
Petition Clause.5 As lawsuits brought to interfere with a party’s exercise 
of petitioning activity, SLAPPs have a chilling effect on constitutionally 
protected speech.6 
 Although many citizen environmental enforcers may find them-
selves fighting a SLAPP in federal court, there is currently no effective 
defense against a SLAPP brought in federal court.7 SLAPP defenses in 
federal courts are presently limited to a narrow set of options: use of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing for the extension of a 
definition of protected petitioning rooted in antitrust caselaw, or at-
tempting to apply state anti-SLAPP statutes under the Erie doctrine.8 
None of these defenses adequately or effectively address the needs of 
those facing a SLAPP in federal court.9 
 In December 2009, Representative Steve Cohen introduced fed-
eral anti-SLAPP legislation in the form of the Citizen Participation Act 
of 2009.10 This Act attempts to provide an effective federal SLAPP de-
fense by allowing SLAPPs to be quickly identified and dismissed before 
their costs can grow to excessive amounts.11 In addition, the Act con-
tains a fee-shifting provision, which can further lighten any resource-
draining effects of the litigation.12 
 This Note examines the Citizen Participation Act of 2009 and its 
likely efficacy as a SLAPP defense. Part I explores the concept of SLAPPs 
in general, including a discussion of SLAPPs and environmental law-
suits.13 Part II examines the right to petition, its modern interpretation, 
and the interplay between SLAPPs and the right to petition.14 Part III 
investigates the effects of SLAPPs on speech.15 Part IV surveys the 
SLAPP defenses that are currently available in the court system.16 Part V 
considers each one of those defenses and explains why they offer inade-
                                                                                                                      
5 Canan & Pring, supra note 3, at 506–07. 
6 See George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 Pace 
Envtl. L. Rev. 3, 8 (1989). 
7 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 190. 
8 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 12(b)(6), 56; City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 
499 U.S. 365, 379–80 (1991); United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space 
Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999). 
9 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 12(b)(6), 56; Omni, 499 U.S. at 379–80; Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973. 
10 Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. (2009). 
11 See id. §§ 3–5. 
12 See id. § 8. 
13 See infra Part I. 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 See infra Part III. 
16 See infra Part IV. 
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quate protection in the federal courts.17 Finally, Part VI argues for fed-
eral anti-SLAPP legislation as the best federal SLAPP defense and ana-
lyzes the proposed federal bill.18 
I. SLAPPs Generally 
 SLAPPs were first identified and studied in the mid-1980s by Pro-
fessors Penelope Canan and George W. Pring.19 An early study defined 
SLAPPs as “civil lawsuits . . . filed against non-governmental individuals 
and groups for having communicated their views to a government body 
or official on an issue of some public interest.”20 Stated in different 
terms, SLAPPs are lawsuits that “claim injury from citizen efforts to in-
fluence a government body or the electorate on an issue of public sig-
nificance.”21 
 All SLAPPs fulfill four defining characteristics.22 First, to be a 
SLAPP, a lawsuit must primarily “involve communications made to in-
fluence a governmental action or outcome.”23 Subsequently, those 
communications must “result[] in (a) a civil complaint or counterclaim 
(b) filed against nongovernment individuals or organizations . . . on (c) 
a substantive issue of some public interest or social significance.”24 In 
other words, a SLAPP requires an underlying communication, gener-
ally to the government, which becomes the object of the SLAPP suit.25 
SLAPPs generally take the form of common torts, and can appear in 
practically any area of law.26 A 1989 study of 228 SLAPP cases revealed 
that while the majority of these suits were brought as charges of defa-
mation, SLAPPs were also brought as claims of business torts, judicial 
torts, conspiracy, constitutional civil rights violations, and nuisance.27 
 As an example, consider a corporation that applies for a permit to 
conduct a restricted activity, perhaps some form of waste disposal. A 
private citizen writes a letter to the permitting body, attempting to con-
                                                                                                                      
17 See infra Part V. 
18 See infra Part VI. 
19 Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at x. 
20 Pring, supra note 6, at 4. 
21 Canan & Pring, supra note 3, at 507. 
22 Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
23 Id. at 8. 
24 Id. at 8–9. 
25 See Pring, supra note 6, at 7–8. 
26 See id. at 9. 
27 Id. Business torts included charges of interference with contract, restraint of trade, 
and other antitrust activities, while judicial torts included charges of abuse of process and 
malicious prosecution. Id. nn.12–13. 
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vince the permitting body to deny the permit. In response, the corpo-
ration files suit for damages against the private citizen, possibly alleging 
defamation or libel. The corporation’s lawsuit would be a SLAPP—a 
civil complaint for monetary damages against a non-governmental in-
dividual who communicated to a government body on an issue of pub-
lic concern.28 The corporation would be the “SLAPP filer,” and the pri-
vate citizen would be the “SLAPP target.”29 
A. A Brief History of SLAPPs 
 SLAPPs have been used to threaten public participation in gov-
ernment since the early days of the American judicial system.30 Early 
SLAPPs were generally struck down by the courts, and eventually disap-
peared almost completely.31 It wasn’t until the 1970s and the resurgence 
of political activism, particularly the environmental movement, that 
SLAPPs were again used as a legal tool.32 
B. SLAPPs and Environmental Lawsuits 
 Environmental issues are common subjects of SLAPPs.33 Of the 
228 cases analyzed by Professors Pring and Canan in 1989, at least forty-
three concerned potential environmental issues.34 Many federal envi-
ronmental statutes contain citizen-enforcement provisions.35 For ex-
ample, the Clean Water Act allows “any citizen” to file suit against al-
leged violators.36 Similarly, the Clean Air Act bestows enforcement 
                                                                                                                      
28 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
29 As lawsuits overlying other communications, which may themselves be lawsuits, the 
language of SLAPPs can get confusing. For this reason, this Note will refer to the bringer of 
the overlying civil complaint or counterclaim as the “SLAPP filer,” and the non-governmental 
individual or group who made the initial communication as the “SLAPP target.” 
30 See, e.g., Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyl. 129, 4 Am.Dec. 728 (Vt. 1802). In Harris, five 
citizens wrote to the Vermont legislature to protest Ebenezer Harris’s reappointment as 
Justice of the Peace, painting Harris in less-than-favorable terms. Id. at 729. Harris re-
sponded with a SLAPP against the citizens. See id. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed a 
jury’s verdict in favor of Harris, noting that “[a]n absolute and unqualified indemnity from 
all responsibility in the petitioner is indispensible, from the right of petitioning the su-
preme power for the redress of grievances.” Id. at 733. 
31 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 18. 
32 See id. 
33 See Pring, supra note 6, at 9. 
34 See id. Twenty-five of the cases involved urban/suburban development and zoning, 
and eighteen of the cases involved environmental/animal rights. Id. 
35 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006). 
36 Id. § 505(a). 
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authority on “any person.”37 Citizen environmental enforcement also 
includes activities such as “report[ing] violations, sit[ting] on govern-
ment boards, testify[ing] at public hearings, . . . [and] lobby[ing] agen-
cies.”38 Citizen efforts have been described as having the “central role 
. . . in creating and shaping environmental law.”39 
                                                                                                                     
 Citizen and NGO enforcement of environmental laws is protected 
Petition Clause activity.40 However, if the violator is a large corporation 
that decides to sue a private citizen in response to her petitioning activ-
ity, the corporation likely has the resources to use the costly litigation 
process to “break” the citizen.41 At the very least, these threats of retalia-
tion may cause the citizen to reconsider or even abandon her petition-
ing activity, chilling her desire to engage in activity the First Amendment 
protects.42 
 Because of the resource-draining, speech-chilling effects of SLAPPs, 
opponents of citizen and NGO environmental watchdogs have used 
SLAPPs as a method of intimidation since the beginning of the envi-
ronmental movement.43 As early as 1975, scholars noted that “[p]arties 
whose interests are threatened by environmental suits . . . have jeopard-
ized the continued development and future effectiveness of citizen en-
forcement of environmental protection laws by devising a new litigation 
strategy—the assertion of a multi-million dollar counteraction . . . 
against the environmental plaintiff.”44 
II. The Right to Petition 
 Scholars have recognized the importance of citizen involvement in 
a democratic government for thousands of years.45 As Aristotle ob-
served, “if liberty and equality . . . are chiefly to be found in democracy, 
they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the govern-
 
37 Clean Air Act § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006). 
38 Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 83. 
39 Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and 
Society 398 (3rd ed. 2004). 
40 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 84; infra Part II. 
41 See Stacy J. Silveira, Comment, The American Environmental Movement: Surviving 
Through Diversity, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 497, 529 (2001) (“litigation is too long and 
costly for most grassroots groups”). 
42 See Pring, supra note 6, at 8. 
43 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 83–84. 
44 Note, Counterclaim and Countersuit Harassment of Private Environmental Plaintiffs: The 
Problem, Its Implications, and Proposed Solutions, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 106, 106–07 (1975). 
45 See Aristotle, Aristotle’s Politics bk. IV, at 156 (H. W. C. Davis ed., Benjamin 
Jowett trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
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ment to the utmost.”46 The right to petition grew out of pre-Magna 
Carta practices and was protected in the Great Charter itself.47 The 
right to petition continued to mature throughout English history, and 
was enshrined by the Founding Fathers in the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.48 Modern courts have given the right to 
petition a very broad interpretation, even going so far as to designate 
the right as one of the “fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions.”49 
                                                                                                                     
A. The Modern Interpretation of the Right to Petition 
 Today, the courts give the right to petition a broad interpretation.50 
In its modern form, the right to petition covers any peaceful, legal at-
tempt to influence any branch of government at any level.51 “Protected 
activities include . . . filing complaints, reporting violations of law, testify-
ing before government bodies, writing letters, lobbying legislatures, ad-
vocating before administrative agencies, circulating petitions, conduct-
ing initiative and referendum campaigns, and filing lawsuits. It even 
protects peaceful demonstrations, protests, picketing, and boycotts 
aimed at producing government action.”52 The right to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances “is implicit in ‘[t]he very idea of 
government, republican in form.’”53 
B. Are SLAPPs Themselves Protected Exercises of the Right to Petition? 
 Under the modern interpretation of the right to petition, filing 
lawsuits is generally a protected activity.54 SLAPPs represent the conflict 
between the parties’ petitioning activities—the initial petition by the 
SLAPP target and the following lawsuit by the SLAPP filer.55 “When two 
sides each have fundamental constitutional rights, they must be bal-
anced, must somehow be quantified or limited so that each does not 
 
46 Id. 
47 See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right 
to Petition, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2153, 2163–64 (1998). 
48 See id. at 2165–70, 2203. 
49 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); accord Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 16. 
50 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 16. 
51 See id. 
52 Id. 
53 McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 
92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)). 
54 Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 16. 
55 See id. 
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cancel out the other.”56 In general, policy and constitutional considera-
tions result in a tipping of the balance in favor of the SLAPP target and 
against the SLAPP filer.57 
 Tipping the balance against certain lawsuits is not a new idea in 
American jurisprudence.58 The judicial system already presupposes that 
certain lawsuits fall outside of First Amendment protections.59 For ex-
ample, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure go so far as to allow the 
court to impose sanctions for lawsuits unwarranted by law or fact, as 
well as those brought for an “improper purpose.”60 
 While both SLAPP filers and targets represent their own private 
interests and injuries, SLAPP targets also implicate “the additional, 
broader concerns of continued public participation in government, the 
viability of the representative political process itself.”61 A SLAPP target 
petitions the government with the goal of participating in and affecting 
a governmental decision.62 In contrast, the SLAPP filer has “completely 
different goals . . . not a government result or outcome but monetary 
compensation from the target.”63 Therefore, when there is a conflict 
between a SLAPP filer’s right to petition and that of a SLAPP target, the 
balance often tips in favor of the SLAPP target.64 
III. The Effect of SLAPPs on the Right to Petition 
 By their very moniker, SLAPPs imply a conflict with the right to 
petition—a SLAPP is a lawsuit, strategically brought “against” public 
participation to discourage or disrupt petitioners.65 Public participation 
is the very essence of the right to petition and is protected by the First 
Amendment’s Petition Clause.66 Although SLAPPs look like normal 
lawsuits, they are often brought for an ulterior motive.67 SLAPPs are 
typically brought in an attempt to block citizen involvement in the po-
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. at 12. 
57 See id. at 12, 87. 
58 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c) (providing a means to sanction bringers of undesirable 
lawsuits). 
59 See id. 11(b). 
60 Id. 11(b)–(c). 
61 Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 12. 
62 See id. at 87. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 12. 
65 See Canan & Pring, supra note 3, at 506. 
66 Id. 
67 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 29. 
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litical process or to punish citizens who have already participated.68 
Prevailing on a SLAPP in court is typically not the goal of a SLAPP 
filer;69 rather, filers hope to transform a political debate into a legal 
one, chilling speech and draining their opponent’s resources.70 
 A SLAPP is an example of what the Supreme Court was referring 
to when it wrote that “[a] lawsuit no doubt may be used . . . as a power-
ful instrument of coercion or retaliation.”71 Targets of a SLAPP will 
likely have to incur legal expenses to deal with the SLAPP and may ex-
perience a chilling effect on their willingness to petition the govern-
ment.72 As one SLAPP filer wrote, “[s]ee even if I lose the cases. [sic] 
I’m still going to win because I’m [going to force them] to spend at 
least $50,000.00 each in legal fees. Either way. I win.”73 
 Protect Our Mountain Environment v. District Court (POME ) is a well-
known example of the resource-draining and speech-chilling effects of a 
SLAPP.74 In 1978, at the request of developers Gayno, Inc., and Lock-
port Corporation (collectively Gayno), Jefferson County, Colorado, re-
zoned over 500 acres of land in order to allow Gayno to proceed with a 
planned development.75 Later that year a local environmental group, 
Protect Our Mountain Environment (POME), and nine individuals 
sued the county zoning board and Gayno, accusing the board of exceed-
ing its jurisdiction and abusing its discretion.76 POME did not prevail.77 
 In 1980, Gayno filed a SLAPP against POME and its legal counsel 
in Colorado state court, alleging abuse of the legal process and civil 
conspiracy and seeking $10 million in compensatory damages and $30 
million in exemplary damages.78 POME filed a motion to dismiss on 
the ground that POME’s action “was an exercise of the First Amend-
                                                                                                                      
68 Pring, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
69 See id. Over three-quarters of SLAPPs are won in court by the SLAPP targets. Id. at 12. 
70 See id. 
71 Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740 (1983). 
72 See id. at 740–41. 
73 Sean P. Trende, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legislation, and the Blogosphere: New Solutions 
for an Old Problem, 44 Duq. L. Rev. 607, 607 (2006) (quoting an e-mail from Anthony Di-
Meo to “Scott” ( July 10, 2006) (on file with Sean P. Trende)). Anthony DiMeo was the 
plaintiff in DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 248 F. App’x 280 (3rd 
Cir. 2007), where he brought suit against Max for offensive comments posted by anony-
mous others on a website hosted by Max. Id. at 524–25. DiMeo’s suit was dismissed and his 
motion to file an amended complaint was denied. Id. at 533. 
74 See 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984). 
75 Id. at 1362–63. 
76 Id. at 1363. 
77 Id. at 1364. 
78 Id. 
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ment right to petition the government for redress of grievances.”79 The 
district court denied POME’s motion.80 On appeal in 1984, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court handed down a new rule for resolving motions to 
dismiss based on the right to petition for redress of grievances and re-
manded the case.81 After another year in district court, Gayno finally 
dropped the entire matter.82 
 Gayno’s lawsuit against POME satisfies the four defining character-
istics of a SLAPP.83 First, Gayno’s complaint against POME, the SLAPP, 
involved a communication POME made to influence a governmental 
outcome.84 Gayno’s complaint against POME was made in response to 
POME’s lawsuit against Gayno and the board—the communication— 
which was brought in an attempt to overturn the board’s approval of 
Gayno’s rezoning petition.85 The communication at issue, POME’s 
1978 lawsuit, resulted in a civil complaint, Gayno’s 1980 lawsuit.86 
Gayno’s complaint was filed against POME, a non-governmental or-
ganization.87 Finally, the issue was a substantive issue of some public 
interest—rezoning.88 
 Examining the POME case illustrates the resource-draining effect 
of a SLAPP.89 Gayno’s “development has never been built, and in 1995 
community and county leaders [were] completing plans to acquire and 
preserve the property as open space—exactly what POME wanted in 
the first place.”90 Although it appears that POME “won” the battle, the 
result came at a very high price: 
The lawsuit dragged on for nearly four years, taking a tre-
mendous toll in stress, lost time and work, and mounting legal 
costs. POME’s leaders ceased being environmental watchdogs 
in their community and withdrew from public life; some liter-
ally moved out of town. Popular support for POME faded, 
contributions dried up, and the organization died.91 
                                                                                                                      
79 Id. 
80 POME, 677 P.2d at 1364. 
81 Id. at 1369. 
82 Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 44. 
83 See id. at 8–9. 
84 POME, 677 P.2d at 1363–64. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. at 1364. 
87 See id. at 1362, 1364. 
88 Id. at 1362. 
89 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 6. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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 In addition to the resource-draining effect the SLAPP had on 
POME, the case also exemplifies the chilling effect SLAPPs can have on 
the public’s exercise of the right to petition.92 “[A] decade later, envi-
ronmental campaigns in [Jefferson County] can be withered by the 
phrase: ‘Remember POME.’”93 
IV. Current Defenses for SLAPP Targets 
 There are a number of current defenses for SLAPP targets at both 
the state and federal level.94 SLAPP targets can use the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in their defense,95 and turn to an expansive definition 
of protected petitioning activity that evolved in the context of antitrust 
caselaw.96 In addition, many states have passed anti-SLAPP legislation 
that SLAPP targets can use to move for the early dismissal of a SLAPP 
suit.97 These state statutes can be used in some federal jurisdictions un-
der the Erie doctrine, but this use is not consistent in all federal 
courts.98 Recently, anti-SLAPP legislation was introduced at the federal 
level.99 As of late 2010, the bill was being considered by the House Ju-
diciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy, 
although it appears to have stalled.100 
A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be used defensively by 
SLAPP targets.101 The Federal Rules provide SLAPP targets with the 
opportunity to move for the early dismissal of the SLAPP, as well as seek 
                                                                                                                      
92 See id. 
93 Id. 
94 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 12(b)(6), 56; City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 
499 U.S. 365, 379–80 (1991); United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space 
Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999). 
95 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 12(b)(6), 56. 
96 See Omni, 499 U.S. at 379–80. 
97 Michael Eric Johnston, A Better SLAPP Trap: Washington State’s Enhanced Statutory Pro-
tection for Targets of “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,” 38 Gonz. L. Rev. 263, 
275–76 (2002–2003). 
98 Compare Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973 (applying California’s anti-SLAPP statute to a fed-
eral diversity case), with Stuborn Ltd. P’ship v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316 (D. 
Mass. 2003) (holding that Massachusetts’ anti-SLAPP statute is not available in federal 
court). 
99 Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. (2009). 
100 Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R. 4364, Libr. of Congress, Tho-
mas, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.111hr4364 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
101 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 12(b)(6), 56. 
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sanctions against the SLAPP filer.102 Since a SLAPP is, by definition, a 
civil lawsuit,103 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available to all 
targets of SLAPPs brought in federal court.104 
 Rule 12(b)(6) allows a SLAPP target to assert, as a defense, that 
the SLAPP “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”105 
Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint requires only “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”106 
Rule 8(a)(2) does not require detailed factual allegations, but the alle-
gations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”107 The Supreme Court recently held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly that a complaint must contain enough facts to show a plausi-
ble, rather than merely possible, entitlement to relief.108 This pleading 
standard applies to all civil actions.109 
 Rule 56 gives federal SLAPP targets another defense.110 This rule 
provides targets with the opportunity to move for summary judgment in 
an attempt to end the adjudication.111 A motion for summary judgment 
can be brought any time until thirty days after the close of discovery.112 
The opposing party, the SLAPP filer in this case, must “set out [in its 
response] specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.”113 If necessary 
to the opposing party’s response, the court may order a continuance in 
order to enable further discovery.114 “The judgment sought should be 
rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, 
and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled judgment as a matter of law.”115 
 In addition to early dismissal of the SLAPP, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provide a means whereby the court may impose sanc-
tions on a SLAPP filer.116 As a matter of law, the filing of a SLAPP acts 
as a certification that the lawsuit “is not being presented for any im-
                                                                                                                      
102 See id. 
103 Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 8. 
104 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 
105 Id. 12(b)(6). 
106 Id. 8(a)(2). 
107 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
108 See id. at 570. 
109 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). 
110 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
111 See id. 56(b). 
112 Id. 56(c)(1)(A). 
113 Id. 56(e)(2). 
114 Id. 56(f)(2). 
115 Id. 56(c)(2). 
116 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 
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proper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or need-
lessly increase the cost of litigation.”117 Should the court find, upon 
motion by the SLAPP target or the court’s initiative, that the lawsuit was 
brought for an improper purpose, Rule 11 allows the court to impose 
sanctions.118 Improper purposes can include motives “such as personal 
or economic harassment.”119 A Rule 11 sanction “must be limited to 
what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct 
by others similarly situated,”120 but may include an “award to the pre-
vailing party [of] the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, 
incurred for the motion.”121 
                                                                                                                     
B. Federal Caselaw 
 Key Supreme Court decisions in the antitrust realm have developed 
an expansive constitutional definition of protected petitioning activity, 
creating a possible SLAPP defense in other areas of law.122 Beginning in 
the early 1960s, the Court has considered multiple SLAPPs brought 
where the underlying communication made to influence governmental 
action allegedly violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.123 Throughout 
these cases, the Court has held that petitioning the government is a pro-
tected activity, even if the petitioning would otherwise violate the 
Sherman Act.124 Petitioning activity is protected regardless of intent or 
purpose, unless the petitioning itself is the group’s only goal.125 
 
117 Id. 11(b)(1). 
118 Id. 11(c)(2)–(3). 
119 Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1987). 
120 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). 
121 Id. 11(c)(2). 
122 See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); United 
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
123 See Omni, 499 U.S. at 369; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129, 132. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.” 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Section 2 punishes “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt 
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States.” Id. § 2. In sum, the Sherman 
Act comprehensively “provide[s] against combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade 
or commerce, the monopolization of trade or commerce, or attempts to monopolize the 
same.” D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 173–74 (1915). 
124 See Omni, 499 U.S. at 379–80 (summarizing Noerr and Pennington). 
125 See id. at 380. 
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1. The “Sham Exception” from Noerr-Pennington’s Definition of 
Protected Petitioning Activity 
 In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court reviewed SLAPP suits in the 
antitrust context in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc. and United Mine Workers v. Pennington. In the former case, 
the Court was faced with cross SLAPPs between a group of truck opera-
tors and a group of railroads alleging petitioning activity in violation of 
the Sherman Act.126 The Court gave great latitude to the right to peti-
tion, holding that the petitioning activity of both groups was protected 
and that “mere group solicitation of governmental action” did not vio-
late the Sherman Act, even if done solely for an anticompetitive pur-
pose.127 Four years later, the Court, in Pennington, reached a similar 
conclusion when presented with allegations of Sherman Act violations 
in response to the United Mine Workers’ efforts to enforce a royalty 
contract in the courts.128 The Court again emphasized that “[j]oint ef-
forts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even 
though intended to eliminate competition.”129 
 Despite its protection of the right to petition even when the peti-
tioning activity might otherwise violate the Sherman Act, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine left one exception that could be used to infringe 
upon this right.130 The Noerr Court was careful to identify the possibility 
that a petition might merely be a “sham” to cover otherwise illegal be-
havior.131 “There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, os-
tensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere 
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to inter-
fere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the ap-
plication of the Sherman Act would be justified.”132 In these situations, a 
campaign would lose its Petition Clause protection.133 In a later antitrust 
case, the Court explained that even a petitioning activity performed 
with the mere intent to block access to meaningful adjudication and 
“usurp [the] decisionmaking process” was not protected under the Peti-
tion Clause.134 The Court explicitly focused on intent, stating that “such 
                                                                                                                      
126 See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129, 132. 
127 Id. at 138–39. 
128 381 U.S. at 659, 670. 
129 Id. at 670. 
130 See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See id. 
134 Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1972). 
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a purpose or intent . . . would be to discourage and ultimately prevent 
the respondents from invoking the processes of the administrative 
agencies and courts and thus fall within the exception to Noerr.”135 
2. The Supreme Court Strengthened SLAPP Defenses When it 
Eliminated the Sham Exception 
 In time, the Supreme Court limited Noerr-Pennington’s sham excep-
tion, shifting the focus from the petitioner’s intent to the expected out-
come of the petitioning.136 In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc., the Court considered an antitrust SLAPP between two companies 
engaged in the billboard business.137 The SLAPP filer attempted to use 
the sham exception against a lobbying campaign that allegedly violated 
the Sherman Act.138 However, the Supreme Court explained that the 
lobbying activities were not a sham and were protected under Noerr-
Pennington so far as any Sherman Act violations were concerned.139 
Rather than focusing on petitioner’s intent as it had previously, the 
Court instead focused on the expected outcome of the petitioning.140 
“Although [the SLAPP target] indisputably set out to disrupt [the 
SLAPP filer]’s business relationships, it sought to do so not through the 
very process of lobbying, . . . but rather through the ultimate product of 
that lobbying . . . .”141 Regarding intent, the Court wrote “[t]hat a pri-
vate party’s political motives are selfish is irrelevant: ‘Noerr shields from 
the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regard-
less of intent or purpose.’”142 Omni’s holding protected SLAPP targets 
by removing from the scope of the sham exception any petitioning ac-
tivity undertaken in an attempt to influence government action, re-
gardless of the petitioners’ intent.143 
3. Extension Beyond the Antitrust Realm 
 Noerr, Pennington, and Omni all deal with the issue of whether a pe-
titioning activity, which would otherwise be in violation of the Sherman 
                                                                                                                      
135 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
136 See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379–80 (1991). 
137 See id. at 367, 369. 
138 See id. at 368–69, 382. 
139 Id. at 382. 
140 See id. at 381–82. 
141 Id. at 381. 
142 Omni, 499 U.S. at 380 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 
670 (1965)). 
143 See id. 
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Act, is nevertheless protected under the First Amendment’s Petition 
Clause and immunized from Sherman Act liability.144 Although devel-
oped in the antitrust realm, some federal courts have shown a willing-
ness to extend Noerr-Pennington to protect Petition Clause activity in 
other subject areas.145 In Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. 
Wells, the Third Circuit recognized the application of Noerr-Pennington 
to protect private citizens’ petitioning activity to report aborrent condi-
tions in a nursing home.146 In a decision later affirmed by the Fourth 
Circuit, the Maryland District Court applied the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine to protect petitioning activity from the common law claims of ma-
licious use of process, abuse of process, tortious interference with pro-
spective advantage, fraud, and conspiracy.147 The Supreme Court has 
not given a clear pronouncement as to its willingness to extend Noerr-
Pennington beyond the antitrust realm.148 
C. Statutory Defenses 
 Anti-SLAPP laws can provide SLAPP targets with additional de-
fenses.149 These defenses include procedural mechanisms allowing 
SLAPP targets to get the SLAPP dismissed from court, as well as provi-
sions allowing SLAPP targets who prevail on a motion to dismiss to re-
cover attorney’s fees and costs.150 
                                                                                                                      
144 See supra Parts IV.B.1–.2. 
145 See, e.g., Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155, 160 
(3rd Cir. 1988). In Brownsville, two private citizens visited the nursing home in their efforts 
to find a suitable home for a relative. Id. at 157–58. Appalled by the conditions they ob-
served, the two citizens reported their observations to state and federal officials, as well as 
the general public. Id. at 158. The nursing home was eventually decertified. Id. In re-
sponse, Brownsville filed a SLAPP against the two citizens, alleging that they had engaged 
in a civil conspiracy to interfere with the nursing home’s business relations. Id. at 157. 
146 See id. at 160 (citing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as grounds for holding that “de-
fendants’ actions in calling Brownsville’s violations to the attention of state and federal 
authorities and eliciting public interest cannot serve as the basis of . . . liability”). 
147 Baltimore Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co., 81 F. Supp. 2d 602, 620 (D. Md. 2000) 
(“Because the defendants’ behavior is protected from antitrust liability by the First 
Amendment under Noerr-Pennington, it is likewise protected from state common law liabil-
ity.”), aff’d, 237 F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 2001). 
148 Compare Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 
49, 59 (1993) (“[w]hether applying Noerr as an antitrust doctrine or invoking it in other 
contexts”), with Omni, 499 U.S. at 380 (noting that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine rests ulti-
mately on an interpretation of antitrust laws). 
149 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 189. 
150 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 554.02–.04 (West 2010). 
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1. State Statutory Defenses 
 To protect citizens who wish to participate in government, states 
have begun to pass anti-SLAPP legislation.151 As of early 2011, twenty-
seven states have passed anti-SLAPP legislation.152 In many instances, 
this legislation was passed in order to provide an expedited way for the 
courts to deal with SLAPPs, rather than forcing SLAPP targets to deal 
with standard, lengthy court procedures.153 The precise workings and 
the scope of anti-SLAPP legislation can differ widely between states.154 
 The scope of state statutes protecting petitioning activity generally 
falls into one of several different categories. Some states follow the 
POME standard, protecting a SLAPP target’s petitioning activity unless 
the petitioning does not contain any reasonable factual support or any 
arguable basis in law and causes actual compensable injury to the 
SLAPP filer.155 These states include Arizona, Massachusetts, and Ver-
mont.156 Other states, including Illinois, Minnesota, and Rhode Island, 
follow the Omni standard and protect petitioning activity unless the pe-
titioning is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government 
action.157 A third class of states protects petitioning activity unless the 
SLAPP filer can show some chance of prevailing in its claim against the 
                                                                                                                      
151 John G. Osborn & Jeffrey A. Thaler, Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Law: Special Protection 
Against Improper Lawsuits Targeting Free Speech and Petitioning, 23 Me. B.J. 32, 32 (2008). 
152 See Your State’s Free Speech Protections, Publ. Participation Project, http://anti-
slapp.org/?q=node/12 (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
153 See Johnston, supra note 97, at 279. 
154 See, e.g., id. at 276–80 (discussing differing policy objectives and statutory defenses 
among state anti-SLAPP laws). 
155 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-752(B) (Supp. 2010); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 
ch. 231, § 59H (West 2000); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1041(e)(1) (Supp. 2010); see also Pro-
tect Our Mountain Env’t v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Colo. 1984) (protecting 
SLAPP targets unless “(1) the [SLAPP target]’s administrative or judicial claims were de-
void of reasonable factual support, or, if so supportable, lacked any cognizable basis in law 
for their assertion; [or] (2) the primary purpose of the [SLAPP target]’s petitioning activ-
ity was to harass the [SLAPP filer] or to effectuate some other improper objective; [or] (3) 
the [SLAPP target]’s petitioning activity had the capacity to adversely affect a legal interest 
of the [SLAPP filer]”). 
156 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-752(B); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 59H; Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1041(e)(1). 
157 See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 110/15 (West Supp. 2011); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 554.03 
(West 2010); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a) (1997); see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor 
Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991). 
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SLAPP target.158 These states include California, Delaware, and Ore-
gon.159 
 Some state anti-SLAPP statutes create an expedited process for de-
termining whether the SLAPP target’s petitioning activity is protected 
and, if so, dismissing the SLAPP.160 Some states, such as Nevada and 
Oregon, allow a special motion to dismiss, which SLAPP targets can 
bring early in judicial proceedings in order to raise the defense that 
their petitioning activity is protected.161 In some states, once the SLAPP 
target brings a motion to dismiss, discovery is suspended and the court 
is required to hold a hearing on the motion within a short amount of 
time.162 This time frame may either be defined, such as Arkansas’ thirty 
days,163 or open to the court’s discretion, such as Maryland’s “as soon as 
practicable” standard.164 
 Many states award attorney’s fees and costs to a SLAPP target who 
prevails on a motion to dismiss.165 Some states also allow the courts to 
award compensatory and punitive damages to the SLAPP target.166 
2. Federal Statutory Defenses 
 Currently there is no federal statute specifically designed to defend 
SLAPP targets.167 A small number of statutes protect specific uses of the 
right to petition,168 but comprehensive protections have yet to be 
passed by Congress.169 In December 2009, comprehensive anti-SLAPP 
legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives, but this bill 
appears to be stalled in committee.170 At the present, the strongest 
                                                                                                                      
158 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2004); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, 
§ 8137 (1999); Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150(3) (2009). 
159 See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8137; Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 31.150(3). 
160 See Johnston, supra note 97, at 280. 
161 See Nev Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.660(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2006); Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150(1). 
162 See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16-63-507(a)(1)–(2) (2005); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-7-7-6 
(LexisNexis 2008). 
163 Ark. Code Ann. § 1663-507(a)(2). 
164 Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
165 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c) (West 2004); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
110/25 (West Supp. 2011); Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.152(3). 
166 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 554.04(2)(b) (West 2010). 
167 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 190; Trende, supra note 73, at 643–44. 
168 Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 190 (citing federal laws protecting those giving tes-
timony in federal courts and before Congress, as well as whistleblowers). 
169 See id.; Trende, supra note 73, at 643–44. 
170 Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R. 4364, Libr. of Congress, Tho-
mas, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.111hr4364 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
494 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 38:477 
statutory option for SLAPP targets in federal court is to attempt to use 
state anti-SLAPP statutes under the Erie doctrine.171 
a. Use of State Statutes in Federal Court 
 There is currently a circuit split as to whether state anti-SLAPP 
statutes can be used in federal court under the Erie doctrine.172 This 
split is rooted in the courts’ judgment of whether state anti-SLAPP pro-
tections directly conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.173 
The Massachusetts District Court found that a dismissal provision in the 
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law directly conflicted with Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Federal Rules, and held that “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
supplant the state Anti-SLAPP procedures.”174 In contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that a similar provision in California’s 
anti-SLAPP law could exist side-by-side with the Federal Rules, “‘each 
controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.’”175 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the statute was available to 
SLAPP targets in diversity actions.176 
 Recent decisions in federal jurisdictions that permit the use of 
state anti-SLAPP statutes have limited that use to state law claims on-
ly.177 In 2007, the Southern District of California considered a SLAPP 
that alleged civil rights and conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 
and 1985.178 The court denied the SLAPP target’s special motion to 
strike, brought under California’s anti-SLAPP law, and held that “the 
                                                                                                                      
171 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 190; Trende, supra note 73, at 643–44. 
172 Compare United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 
963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying California’s anti-SLAPP statute to a federal diversity 
case), with Stuborn Ltd. v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding 
that Massachusetts’ anti-SLAPP statute is not available in federal court). 
173 Compare Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973 (not in direct conflict), with Stuborn, 245 F. 
Supp. 2d at 316 (direct conflict). The Erie doctrine relies on direct conflict analysis to solve 
procedural choice of law issues. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980); 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). Under Hanna, when a state procedural rule 
directly collides with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules will prevail 
due to their authorization by the Rules Enabling Act. 380 U.S. at 471, 473–74; see also 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). In the absence of a direct collision, Erie’s twin aims of discouraging 
forum shopping and avoiding inequitable administration of the law govern the outcome. 
See Walker, 446 U.S. at 752–53; Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468, 471. 
174 Stuborn, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 316 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463–65). 
175 Newsham, 190 F.3d at 972 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 752). 
176 Id. at 973. 
177 See Best v. Hendrickson Appraisal Co., No. 06-CV-1358 W( JMA), 2007 WL 1110632, 
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2007); Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 
63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
178 Best, 2007 WL 1110632, at *1. 
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[California] anti-SLAPP statute does not, in general, apply to federal 
claims in federal court.”179 
b. Proposed Federal Legislation 
 In December 2009, Representative Steve Cohen introduced a fed-
eral anti-SLAPP bill in the House of Representatives.180 The bill, known 
as the Citizen Participation Act of 2009 (the “Act”), recognizes the im-
portance of public participation in government, damaging effects of 
SLAPP suitson that participation, and the need to identify and elimi-
nate SLAPPs early.181 The Act contains broad protections for petition-
ing activity, including “any written or oral statement made in a place 
open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of 
public interest,”182 and “any written or oral statement made or submit-
ted before a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official 
proceeding authorized by law.”183 The Act creates a special motion to 
dismiss that, after a prima facie showing by SLAPP targets that their pe-
titioning activity was protected, shifts the burden to the SLAPP filer to 
demonstrate “a prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable 
judgment.”184 Once the special motion to dismiss is filed, the Act would 
stay discovery in the case until the motion is disposed.185 Furthermore, 
the Act creates federal removal jurisdiction, allowing SLAPP targets in 
state court to remove the case to federal court and obtain the Act’s pro-
tections.186 Finally, the Act awards a reasonable attorney’s fee to SLAPP 
targets who prevail on the special motion to dismiss.187 Currently, the 
Act has garnered three cosponsors,188 but is stalled awaiting considera-
                                                                                                                      
179 Id. at *3; accord Globetrotter Software, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 (holding that the Califor-
nia anti-SLAPP statute only applies to pendent state law claims, not federal question 
claims, when both are asserted in the same action). 
180 Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. (2009). 
181 See id. §§ 2, 5. 
182 Id. § 11(1)(B). The Act defines an “issue of public interest” as “includ[ing] an issue 
related to health or safety; environmental, economic or community well-being; the gov-
ernment; a public figure; or a good, product or service in the market place,” while explic-
itly excluding “statements directed primarily toward protecting the speaker’s business in-
terests.” Id. § 11(5). 
183 Id. § 11(2)(A). 
184 Id. § 5(b). 
185 H.R. 4364 § 5(c). 
186 Id. § 6(a). 
187 Id. § 8(a). 
188 Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R. 4364—Cosponsors, Libr. of Con-
gress, Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04364:@@@P (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2010) (showing Representatives Charles A. Gonzalez (D-TX), Pete Stark (D-CA), 
and Mike Doyle (D-PA) as cosponsors). 
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tion by the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts and 
Competition Policy.189 
V. All Current Defenses Fail as Effective Defenses for  
Federal SLAPP Targets 
 To be effective, a SLAPP defense must cover all activity protected by 
the Petition Clause.190 Furthermore, a SLAPP defense must provide a 
way to identify SLAPPs early in the judicial process, so as to remove 
those SLAPPs from the judicial process, and to discourage and warn 
against future filing of SLAPPs.191 The best SLAPP defense will strike an 
appropriate balance between protecting the SLAPP itself as a manifesta-
tion of the SLAPP filer’s right to petition and saving the SLAPP target 
from the resource-draining effects of the SLAPP.192 Since one harmful 
consequence of a SLAPP is its chilling effect on protected First Amend-
ment activity, the best SLAPP defense will tip slightly in favor the SLAPP 
target in order to avoid or prevent as much of that chilling effect as pos-
sible.193 
 The current defenses available to federal SLAPP targets are the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and 
state anti-SLAPP statutes as applied in diversity actions through the Erie 
doctrine.194 Each of these defenses has shortfalls that prevent any of 
them from being as effective as well-drafted federal legislation.195 
A. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although available to every 
SLAPP target in federal court,196 fail at being an effective SLAPP de-
fense because they do not allow for efficient and quick identification 
and elimination of SLAPPs, and because they have a very limited deter-
ring effect.197 
                                                                                                                      
189 Id. 
190 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 189. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. at 200–01. 
193 See id. at 12; Pring, supra note 6, at 8. 
194 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 12(b)(6), 56; City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 
499 U.S. 365, 379–80 (1991); United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space 
Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999). 
195 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 12(b)(6), 56; Omni, 499 U.S. at 379–80; Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973. 
196 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
197 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 12(b)(6), 56. 
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 Nonetheless, a successful Rule 12(b)(6) defense would grant a 
SLAPP target dismissal of the SLAPP for failure to state a claim based on 
the Petition Clause’s protections.198 SLAPP targets who prevail on a Rule 
12(b)(6) defense would avoid much of the resource-draining effect of a 
SLAPP.199 Although early dismissal would keep the SLAPP target from 
having to waste resources on a meritless suit, the Federal Rules’ lenient 
pleading requirements could make it difficult for a SLAPP target to pre-
vail.200 Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that a pleading contain “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief.”201 Although the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly could make it slightly easier for a 12(b)(6) defense to 
prevail by requiring that the SLAPP filer show a plausible, as opposed to 
a possible, entitlement to relief,202 trial judges tend to take a wait-and-
see approach when faced with questions about the legitimacy of a 
suit.203 If, in its 12(b)(6) motion, the SLAPP target attempts to clarify 
the nature of the SLAPP by presenting matters outside the SLAPP filer’s 
pleadings, Rule 12(d) would treat the SLAPP target’s motion as one for 
summary judgment, which could implicate a whole new host of prob-
lems for the SLAPP target’s defense.204 Rule 12(b)(6) could be an effec-
tive SLAPP defense if the SLAPP filer’s pleading obviously presents itself 
as a SLAPP, but otherwise Rule 12(b)(6) provides only an uncertain de-
fense that will likely be denied and will allow the trial to continue into 
the expensive discovery phase.205 
                                                                                                                     
 A motion for summary judgment made under Rule 56(b) fails as 
an effective SLAPP defense for essentially the same reasons that a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion fails.206 A motion for summary judgment may be made 
at any time until thirty days after the close of discovery.207 However, the 
summary judgment standard depends in part on the discovery com-
pleted in the case, implying that at least some discovery, with its atten-
 
198 See id. 12(b)(6). 
199 A Rule 12(b)(6) defense can be raised very early in the trial. See id. 12(a)–(b). A 
SLAPP target who raises—and prevails upon—a 12(b)(6) defense before discovery begins 
will avoid much of the cost of litigation. See Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, 
Chilling, Settlement, and the Accuracy of the Legal Process, 26 J.L. Econ. & Org. 144, 153 (2010) 
(“discovery is often the most costly part of litigation”). 
200 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 
201 Id. 
202 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
203 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 158. 
204 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see discussion infra notes 206–211. 
205 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 12. 
206 See id. 56. 
207 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). 
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dant costs, will likely take place before a motion for summary judgment 
can be made.208 Additionally, if the SLAPP filer shows the court that it 
cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition to the motion, the 
court may allow further discovery before ruling on the motion.209 Once 
a trial moves into the discovery phase, SLAPP targets are exposed to the 
full resource-draining effect of the SLAPP.210 Therefore, a Rule 56(b) 
motion for summary judgment is also an ineffective SLAPP defense.211 
 The Federal Rules also provide limited options for deterring the 
filing of future SLAPPs.212 Rule 11 authorizes courts to impose sanc-
tions when a lawsuit has been brought for an improper purpose.213 
These sanctions are “aimed at deterring, and, if necessary punishing 
improper conduct.”214 Nevertheless, in another manifestation of the 
Petition Clause, courts have held that Rule 11 “[s]anctions should be 
sparingly imposed . . . and care should be taken to avoid chilling crea-
tivity or stifling enthusiasm.”215 This type of standard could lead to in-
consistency in the application of sanctions against SLAPP filers, 
whereas effective deterrence is best achieved through consistent appli-
cation of sanctions against SLAPP filers.216 
B. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine also fails as an effective SLAPP de-
fense because of its uncertain application outside the antitrust realm.217 
Although it appears to be a boon for SLAPP targets, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine is constrained by its very facts to the antitrust 
realm.218 In all of the major cases in which the doctrine finds root— 
Noerr, Pennington, and Omni—the Supreme Court held that petitioning 
activity that otherwise may have violated the Sherman Act was in fact 
                                                                                                                      
208 See id. 56(c)(2). 
209 Id. 56(f)(2). 
210 See Friedman & Wickelgren, supra note 199, at 153. 
211 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
212 See id. 11. 
213 Id. 11(b)(1), (c). 
214 United States ex rel. Leno v. Summit Const. Co., 892 F.2d 788, 791 n.4 (9th Cir. 
1989) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
215 Guzzello v. Venteau, 789 F. Supp. 112, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Secs. Indus. 
Ass’n. v. Clarke, 898 F.2d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
216 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 204. 
217 See id. at 28. 
218 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 369, 380 (1991) (not-
ing that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine rests ultimately on an interpretation of antitrust 
laws); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129, 132 (1961). 
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protected under the Petition Clause.219 These holdings could arguably 
create a strong defense of general petitioning activity under the First 
Amendment, but, when limited to their facts, really only help resolve 
questions of conflicts between the Petition Clause and Sherman Act 
violations.220 Although federal courts have applied Noerr-Pennington to 
areas outside the antitrust realm,221 the Supreme Court has not clearly 
stated its willingness to invoke the doctrine in non-antitrust contexts.222 
Many SLAPP targets will have to argue before a judge before they know 
whether the judge will determine that Noerr-Pennington covers their spe-
cific petitioning activity.223 Furthermore, any argument advancing the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine would likely be made as part of a motion to 
dismiss or motion for summary judgment, which would implicate the 
same problems discussed above with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in general.224 
C. State Anti-SLAPP Statutes in Federal Court 
 The final defense available to SLAPP targets in federal court is the 
use of state anti-SLAPP statutes through the Erie doctrine.225 Setting 
aside the obvious fact that the effectiveness of this defense depends on 
the existence of an available state statute and the effectiveness of that 
statute, this defense also fails due to its inconsistent application across 
federal jurisdictions.226 Jurisdictional availability depends on the juris-
diction’s view as to whether there is a direct conflict between the statute 
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.227 While this split can result 
                                                                                                                      
219 See Omni, 499 U.S. at 379–80 (summarizing Noerr and Pennington). 
220 See id. 
221 See Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155, 160 (3rd Cir. 
1988) (citing Noerr-Pennington as grounds for holding that the acts of two private citizens in 
reporting a nursing home’s health code violations were immune from liability); Baltimore 
Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co., 81 F. Supp. 2d 602, 620 (D. Md. 2000) (applying Noerr-
Pennington to state common law liability), aff’d, 237 F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 2001). 
222 Compare Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 
49, 59 (1993) (“[w]hether applying Noerr as an antitrust doctrine or invoking it in other 
contexts”), with Omni, 499 U.S. at 380 (noting that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine rests ulti-
mately on an interpretation of antitrust laws). 
223 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 28. 
224 See supra Part V.A. 
225 See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.3d 
963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999). 
226 Compare id.(applying California’s anti-SLAPP statute to a federal diversity case), with 
Stuborn Ltd. v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding that Massachu-
setts’ anti-SLAPP statute is not available in federal court). 
227 Compare Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973 (not in direct conflict), with Stuborn, 245 F. 
Supp. 2d at 316 (direct conflict). 
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in good news for SLAPP targets in certain federal jurisdictions, the split 
provides inconsistent protection of a First Amendment right.228 In ad-
dition, recent decisions limiting the use of state anti-SLAPP statutes in 
federal jurisdictions, where such use is allowed, further diminish the 
effectiveness of these statutes as a defense in federal courts.229 
VI. Strong Federal Legislation Is the Best Defense for  
Federal SLAPP Targets 
 Given the flaws in current federal-level SLAPP defenses, the best 
defense for federal SLAPP targets would be a well-drafted, comprehen-
sive federal law.230 Currently there is no federal anti-SLAPP legisla-
tion.231 A strong federal law can avoid the Rule 12(b)(6) and 56(b) pit-
falls and limit a SLAPP target’s discovery costs by staying discovery 
while the court determines how to handle the SLAPP.232 A strong fed-
eral law can also avoid the Noerr-Pennington uncertainty by explicitly 
protecting all petitioning activity that falls under the Petition Clause.233 
Finally, a strong federal law can avoid the failures of state laws used un-
der the Erie doctrine by providing a uniform law available to all SLAPP 
targets in all federal jurisdictions.234 
A. Legislative Standard 
 Experts have identified three key points that effective anti-SLAPP 
legislation should address: 
1. Communications: It “must cover all public advocacy and 
communications to government, whether direct or indirect 
and whether in the form of testimony, letters, reports of 
crime, peaceful demonstrations, or petitions.”235 
                                                                                                                      
228 Compare Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973 (petitioning activity protected by state anti-SLAPP 
statute), with Stuborn, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 316 (petitioning activity not protected by state anti-
SLAPP statute). 
229 See Best v. Hendrickson Appraisal Co., No. 06-CV-1358 W( JMA), 2007 WL 1110632, 
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2007); Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 
63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
230 See supra Part V. 
231 See Trende, supra note 73, at 643–44. 
232 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 203. 
233 See id. 
234 See id. 
235 Id.at 189. 
2011] Federal Legislation to Protect SLAPP Defendants 501 
2. Forums: “It must cover all government bodies and agents, 
whether federal, state, or local, and whether legislative, execu-
tive, judicial, or the electorate.”236 
3. Prevention and Cure: It “must set out an effective early re-
view for filed SLAPPs, shifting the burden of proof to the filer 
and, in so doing, serving a clear warning against the future fil-
ing of such suits.”237 
Legislation that meaningfully addresses all three of these areas will ef-
fectively protect SLAPP targets. 
B. Critique of Currently Proposed Federal Legislation 
 The recently introduced Citizen Participation Act of 2009 largely 
succeeds in the three key areas by broadly defining protected activity 
and providing an expedited process for dismissing meritless SLAPPs.238 
Furthermore, the Act includes additional protections which will make it 
available as a strategic choice to SLAPP targets in state courts.239 Never-
theless, state court interpretations of state anti-SLAPP provisions with 
similar language to the Act indicate a potential weakness, and the pro-
tections included in the Act could be further bolstered with a few key 
changes.240 
1. Communications and Forums 
 The Act’s scope of protected constitutional activity is sufficiently 
broad to cover all Petition Clause activity.241 Legislation that effectively 
protects public participation in government must be sufficiently broad 
to cover a variety of communication in a variety of forums. The Act suf-
ficiently addresses the proper communications made to the proper fo-
rums.242 
                                                                                                                      
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 See Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. §§ 5, 11(1)–(2) (2009). 
239 Id. § 6. 
240 See, e.g., Evans v. Unkow, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 627–28 (Ct. App. 1995). Compare Cal. 
Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2004) (dismissing the SLAPP unless the SLAPP filer 
shows “that there is a probability that the [SLAPP filer] will prevail on the claim”), with 
H.R. 4364 § 5(b) (dismissing the SLAPP unless the SLAPP filer shows “that the [SLAPP] is 
both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain 
a favorable judgment”). 
241 See H.R. 4364 § 11(1)–(2). 
242 See id. 
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 The Act protects activities in furtherance of the right of free 
speech and acts of petitioning the government.243 Acts in furtherance 
of the right of free speech include written or oral statements made in 
connection with an issue under review by a governmental body or other 
authorized proceeding or made in public on an issue of public inter-
est.244 Acts of petitioning the government include written or oral state-
ments made or submitted to a governmental body or other authorized 
proceedings that encourage such a statement.245 The language of these 
definitions is very broad, and neither definition is meant to provide a 
comprehensive list of protected activity.246 The definition of acts in fur-
therance of the right of free speech also includes a catch-all clause, 
bringing even more activity under the Act’s protection and aligning the 
Act with constitutional jurisprudence.247 
 The Act’s scope is similar to the scope used by Professors Pring 
and Canan in their model anti-SLAPP legislation.248 Like the Act, the 
model legislation also includes within its scope “[a]cts in furtherance of 
the constitutional right to petition.”249 This model scope is based on 
the Omni ruling, and “spells out the acts or communications covered 
with the maximum constitutional breadth under . . . Omni.”250 The 
Act’s catch-all clause brings the Omni holding into its scope, and will 
protect petitioning activity “regardless of intent or purpose.”251 
                                                                                                                     
 The Act also succeeds in protecting petitioning activity in all the 
appropriate forums.252 Protections are not limited to just one branch of 
government or one particular jurisdiction.253 The Act covers statements 
made to “legislative, executive, or judicial bod[ies], or any other official 
 
243 Id. §§ 3, 4. 
244 Id. § 11(1). 
245 Id. § 11(2). 
246 See id. § (11)(1),(2) (containing the comprehensive language “includes but is not 
limited to”). 
247 Id. § (11)(1)(C) (“any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitu-
tional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an 
issue of public interest”). 
248 See Pring & Canan, supra note 2, at 203. Pring and Canan’s model legislation 
“melds the most effective elements of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Omni decision, the federal 
Model State Volunteer Service bill, and the California, New York, and Minnesota [anti-
SLAPP statutes].” Id. at 201. 
249 Id. at 203. 
250 Id. at 205. 
251 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted); see H.R. 4364 § 11(1)(C). 
252 See H.R. 4364 § 11(1)–(2). 
253 See id. 
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proceeding authorized by law,”254 as well as “the public or a public fo-
rum.”255 This language effectively “cover[s] all government bodies and 
agents, whether federal, state, or local, and whether legislative, execu-
tive, judicial, or the electorate.”256 Some states, such as Maryland, have 
chosen to be more explicit as to covered jurisdictions, protecting com-
munications “with a federal, State, or local government body or the 
public at large.”257 However, there is no reason to believe that the Act’s 
broad language would not apply to the named government branches in 
any jurisdiction. 
2. Prevention and Cure 
 The Act could be stronger at providing a judicial cure to SLAPP 
targets as well as discouraging SLAPPs from being filed.258 To effectively 
protect public participation in government, legislation “must set out an 
effective early review for filed SLAPPs, shifting the burden of proof to 
the filer and, in so doing, serving a clear warning against the future fil-
ing of such suits.”259 
 The Act provides separate procedural protections to acts of peti-
tioning the government and acts in furtherance of the constitutional 
right of petition or free speech.260 Acts of petitioning the government 
are strongly and effectively protected by the Act.261 The Act completely 
immunizes all acts of petitioning the government from any civil liability 
except those made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of 
falsity.262 The SLAPP filer must prove knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard of falsity by clear and convincing evidence.263 The “clear and 
convincing” standard is very demanding.264 Therefore, nearly all acts of 
petitioning the government will be immune from SLAPPs.265 
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255 Id. § 11(1)(B). 
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 Acts in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition or free 
speech are afforded separate, potentially weaker procedural protec-
tions.266 The Act creates a special motion to dismiss, which contains a 
burden-shifting provision requiring the SLAPP target to “mak[e] a 
prima facie showing that the claim at issue arises from an act in fur-
therance of the constitutional right of petition or free speech.”267 Once 
that burden is met, responsibility shifts to the SLAPP filer to show “that 
the claim is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima 
facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment.”268 This motion 
protects the SLAPP target’s resources by staying discovery upon filing 
of the motion, as well as requiring that the motion be considered in an 
expedited hearing.269 
 The Act’s protections of acts in furtherance of the constitutional 
right of petition or free speech are likely weak due to the low standard 
imposed on the SLAPP filer.270 California’s anti-SLAPP law employs a 
similar standard, where the special motion to strike can be defeated if 
the SLAPP filer establishes a “probability” of prevailing on the SLAPP.271 
California courts have interpreted this to mean that a SLAPP filer must 
present evidence to show that the SLAPP filer would establish a prima 
facie case at trial,272 which is very similar to the language used by the 
Act.273 Furthermore, California courts have held that the SLAPP filer’s 
right to a jury trial prevents the court from weighing this evidence.274 
This has created a “very easy standard of proof for [SLAPP] filers.”275 If 
the Act is interpreted in a similar way, this easy standard of proof could 
                                                                                                                      
266 See id. § 5. These separate procedural protections, markedly different from the 
complete immunization from liability that protects acts of petitioning the government, 
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transfer to the federal courts and weaken the Act’s utility as a SLAPP 
defense.276 
 The Act would be stronger if it followed Pring and Canan’s model 
anti-SLAPP legislation.277 The model legislation does not contain any 
provision for considering the SLAPP filer’s ability to prevail on the 
SLAPP at trial.278 The only way a SLAPP filer can defeat a motion to 
dispose of the SLAPP under the model legislation is by producing 
“clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the [SLAPP target] are 
not immunized from liability.”279 This affords a very strong defense to 
SLAPP targets because it unconditionally protects all petitioning activity 
that falls within the model legislation’s scope.280 
 The Act could also be more effective at deterring SLAPP filings.281 
SLAPP targets who prevail on a special motion to dismiss under the Act 
will only be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs.282 Although 
the Act makes these fees and costs nondischargeable in bankruptcy,283 
the Act could further strengthen its deterrent effect by allowing addi-
tional monetary judgments against SLAPP filers.284 Minnesota’s anti-
SLAPP law requires courts to award actual damages upon a showing of 
injury by the SLAPP target and allows courts to award punitive damages 
as well.285 Pring and Canan’s model legislation allows courts to impose 
sanctions “sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct and compara-
ble conduct by others similarly situated,” and also enables injured 
SLAPP targets to seek compensatory and punitive damages.286 
3. Other Benefits of the Act 
 In addition to its efforts to address communications and forums, 
and serve both as a prevention and cure of SLAPPs, the Act includes 
additional benefits for SLAPP targets.287 Perhaps the Act’s strongest 
benefit is the freedom it affords a SLAPP target to remove from state 
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court to federal court, provided that the SLAPP target’s speech activi-
ties would otherwise fall within the scope of the Act.288 Removal juris-
diction is generally only allowed in cases brought in state court where 
the federal district courts have original jurisdiction.289 Therefore, the 
target of a SLAPP that masquerades as a state common law claim and is 
brought by a filer whose citizenship is not diverse from that of the tar-
get would typically be “trapped” in state court.290 Such a SLAPP target 
would be at the mercy of that particular state’s chosen method—or lack 
thereof—of SLAPP protection.291 However, all participants in protected 
First Amendment activity as defined by the Act would be able to remove 
a state case to federal court and obtain the Act’s procedural protec-
tions.292 This removal jurisdiction would be available regardless of the 
presence of complete diversity among the parties to the SLAPP, and 
regardless of the presence of a federal question.293 The Act’s removal 
jurisdiction would be available as an option for the SLAPP targets, al-
lowing targets who prefer the options available in state court to remain 
there as a strategic choice.294 There is no parallel provision to allow the 
SLAPP filer to transfer the lawsuit into federal court;295 as the plaintiff 
in the SLAPP suit, the filer presumably already had first choice as to the 
venue in which to file.296 
Conclusion 
 SLAPPs are insidious lawsuits brought to interfere with a party’s 
constitutionally protected right.297 Without an appropriate defense, 
SLAPP targets will likely suffer the resource-draining effects of a SLAPP, 
as well as experience a chilling effect on their right to petition.298 
SLAPP targets in the environmental realm are especially vulnerable due 
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to the prevalence of citizen and NGO participation in environmental 
enforcement.299 
 Many defenses exist that a federal SLAPP target could use on its 
behalf.300 However, none of these defenses are entirely effective at both 
shielding the SLAPP target and deterring future SLAPPs.301 The best 
and most effective defense for a federal SLAPP target would be well-
drafted, comprehensive federal anti-SLAPP legislation.302 The Citizen 
Participation Act of 2009 would provide strong protections for many 
federal SLAPP targets and is far more effective than any of the current 
defenses.303 Congress should pass this legislation incorporating the 
changes suggested in this Note in order to guarantee that citizen and 
NGO enforcers of environmental laws are effectively protected in their 
petitioning activity. 
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